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Introduction 
 
The agricultural equipment division of Deere and Company was facing a number of challenges 
and opportunities in the spring of 2007. The fundamental challenge was to continue to improve 
their financial performance with an increased focus on growth without sacrificing profitability. 
Although improving profitability was hard to implement, the approach was well understood—
lower cost, reduce assets or increase asset utilization, increase sales, and improve price 
realization by reducing discounts and similar price-cutting programs.  
 
Growing the business was going to be more difficult. The U.S. farm machinery and equipment 
business was a relatively mature market. Clearly, there were opportunities for significant growth 
globally—Brazil, Argentina, the countries of the former Soviet Union, and eventually China and 
India provided significant potential. Furthermore, Deere had been quite successful in growing its 
non-traditional ag business and its consumer products segment, which focuses on products such 
as small tractors, lawn mowers, golf course equipment, and other consumer products and tools. 
However, Deere Ag Division was responsible for the growth strategy in the U.S. farm machinery 
and equipment business, a much tougher market to grow given that cultivated acreage was not 
increasing and sales were cyclical and highly dependent on farmers’ incomes. But, CEO Robert 
Lane had not let the division off the hook. Growing the agricultural business in the United States 
was also important, and that required continued commitment to innovation and new product 
introductions. Lane challenged the team to bring new products and services to market that would 
meet Operating Return on Assets (OROA) and Shareholder Value Added (SVA) goals, as well 
as grow the division at a rate almost twice the industry growth rate of the past 20 years.  
 
Deere was known in the farm equipment industry as an innovator with a constant stream of new 
products in power, tillage, planting, and harvesting equipment. Many of the most successful 
innovations of the past couple of decades were primarily product enhancements during a period 
of reduced labor use and rapid mechanization in the farming sector. The challenge going forward 
was how to grow the farm machinery and equipment business in a period of increasing 
competitive pressure, a relatively mature U.S. agricultural market, high market uncertainty 
(ethanol, farm bill, gas prices), high technological uncertainty (GPS), and shortened cycle time in 
the innovation process because of market and competitive pressures. Despite the challenges, the 
Ag Division management team had a number of alternatives that it could pursue, actually too 
many for its budget. Consequently, the team needed to develop and implement a systematic 
process for assessing each innovation’s potential and to use that process to allocate financial and 
personnel resources to the highest payoff innovations that would meet corporate growth-rate 
goals and yet mitigate the aforementioned uncertainty. 
  
Deere’s History: A Commitment to Quality and Innovation 
 
The legendary agribusiness Deere and Company was founded in 1837 by John Deere, a Vermont 
blacksmith who, a year earlier, had created an innovative design for self-scouring plows for the 
Midwest prairie soil. More than a century later, Deere’s “leaping deer” logo is known and trusted 
universally in the marketplace and continues to symbolize innovative engineering and rugged 
construction in agriculture equipment and tractors. 
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Continuous innovation and new product introductions are a result of a major commitment of 
resources to research and development (R&D) and new product commercialization. Deere’s 
resource commitment to R&D is summarized in Table 1; commitments to R&D have 
consistently been strong compared to competitors. Exhibit A summarizes some of the major 
innovations and new product introductions during the past 50 years. Innovations have involved 
improvements in tractors, combines, implements, and sprayer machinery (sustaining 
innovations), and more recently, in some new information and electronic-based technology, such 
as global positioning systems (GPS) guidance products. 
 
Table 1. Sales and R&D Expenditures for Deere and its Competitors 
$ (in million)  Net Sales  R&D Expenses  R&D as a percent of net sales 
  Deere Deere  Deere  AGCO  CNH  CAT 
2006  19,884  725.8  3.70%  2.40% 3.00% 3.50% 
2005  19,401  677.3  3.50%  2.20% 2.60% 3.20% 
2004  17,673  611.6  3.50%  2.00% 2.30% 3.30% 
2003  13,349  577.3  4.30%  2.00% 2.60% 3.20% 
2002  11,702  527.8  4.50%  2.00% 3.00% 3.50% 
2001  11,077  590.1  5.30%  2.00% 3.40% 3.70% 
2000  11,168  542.1  4.90%  2.00% 3.60% 3.40% 
Source: Annual reports from Deere and Company, AGCO, CNH, and Caterpillar 
 
 
The Lane Challenge 
 
The 170-year history of Deere and Company is characterized by both innovation and quality. 
Even during the agricultural recession of the 1980s, Deere maintained its focus on delivering 
quality products that customers valued, and Deere gained market share as other major 
agricultural equipment companies stumbled or fell by the wayside. But financial performance 
was cyclical, and Deere typically earned a competitive return on capital for only a few years in a 
row before it encountered a significant downturn in performance (Table 2). When Robert Lane 
became CEO and chairman in 2000, his goal was “building a business as great as our products" 
(Nickum, 2005). 
 
Lane’s basic strategy to meet this goal was relatively straightforward—to achieve exceptional 
operating performance and disciplined growth and to do it through high-performance, aligned 
team work. Operational performance has been improving through the classic approaches of cost 
reductions, improved asset utilization and margin enhancing/value pricing, and metrics and 
reward systems that enable the organization to reach new levels. Growth was and continues to be 
a more difficult challenge since Deere already enjoys a strong market share position in the 
American and Canadian farm machinery and equipment markets, and that market has been 
growing only at the modest rate of 3 to 5 percent per year. Growing, therefore, required a 
continued commitment to innovation and new product introductions. 
 
As noted earlier, Deere’s financial commitment to innovation had been unwavering. This 
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“commodity hell” where tired products and services result in “me too” products that may satisfy 
current customer needs but do little to anticipate future needs or opportunities, thus precluding 
earning above-average profits. 
 
Table 2. Deere’s Financial Performance 















Total # of 
employees 
2006 19,884 726 10,232  3,877  5,775    46,500 
2005 19,401 677 10,567  3,605  5,229    47,400 
2004 17,673 612 9,717  3,742  4,214  1,276  46,500 
2003 13,349 577 7,390  3,231  2,728  1,347  43,200 
2002 11,702 528 6,792  2,712  2,199  1,426  43,100 
2001 11,077 590 6,269  2,667  2,086  1,439  45,100 
2000 11,168 542 5,934  2,966  -  1,323  43,700 
1999 9,701  458 5,138  2,648  -  1,136  38,700 
1998 11,925 444 7,217  2,124  -  971  37,000 
1997 11,081 412 7,048  1,772  -  818  34,400 
1996 9,640  370 -  -  -  -  33,900 
1995 8,830  327 -  -  -  -  33,400 
1994 7,663  276 -  -  -  -  34,300 
1993 6,479  270 -  -  -  -  33,100 
Source: Deere and Company’s annual reports 
 
But a financial commitment to innovation is unlikely to be successful without a disciplined 
approach to new project selection. An Accelerated Innovation Process (AIP) had been 
implemented at Deere to evaluate new product/service initiatives more systematically and quickly. 
The AIP starts by identifying areas of opportunity for innovation where it is perceived that Deere 
has the capacity and ability to participate. This step is followed by opportunity identification where 
internal capability is matched with current and future customer needs; this step requires intense 
and sometimes contentious discussion and dialogue between the marketing/sales staff who 
represent the customer’s perspective and the engineering/technology personnel who focus on the 
capability and capacity of current and future technology. The entire process is driven by a set of 
financial performance metrics that maintain consistency and indicate the expected contribution of 
an innovation to Deere’s financial performance.  
 
An additional dimension of Deere’s approach to innovation had been to broaden the focus beyond 
the traditional emphasis on mechanization. Much of Deere’s history had been built on sustaining 
innovations that generally involve improving the performance and/or lowering the cost of current 
product/service offerings to current customers. In contrast, breakthroughs or disruptive innovations 
are new product/service offerings to new or underserved customers; these innovations frequently 
require capabilities and capacities that may be beyond the current skill set of the organization, and 
they may require a more intimate knowledge of potential new customers which may not be the 
focal point of the current sales/marketing initiatives.  
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One of those potential breakthroughs or disruptive areas of innovation was in the realm of 
information management/precision/traceability—an opportunity that is increasingly evolving 
because of the high demand for quality and food safety attributes across the food production and 
distribution value chain, and the increased capability and capacity of information technology and 
telemetry to automatically, in real time, measure, analyze, and deliver critical data and information 
to improve management decision making. As just one example, Robert Lane had described “[…] 
the shift to intelligent machinery. The technology is becoming available to us to bring to the 
customer intelligent, mobile machinery. And these machines will be doubly smart, because every 
day out in the field has different weather conditions and growing conditions. To send a smart 
machine into an environment that is changing every day it has to be intelligent enough to be 
adaptive (Houlihan, 2007).” 
 
Deere was well aware of the traditional approach to thinking about growth in terms of both 
customers and products as reflected in Figure 1. Their perspective was that more focus needed to 
be placed on new products offered to old customers, as well as new customers, but these 
opportunities were characterized by high technical, as well as high market uncertainty. The Deere 
Ag Division found the current discussion about precision agriculture and traceability across the 
food production/distribution value chain interesting. But were its customers and other participants 
in the food production/distribution value chain ready to adopt these new disruptive innovations? 
And, was the information technology available and adaptable to the agricultural production and 
food distribution industry? Those were some of the questions at the top of the agricultural team’s 





















Figure 1. Ansoff’s Product/Market Growth Matrix 
Source: Ansoff (1957) 
 
Although Deere had been a leader in commercializing new products and services in the farm 
machinery and equipment industry, it also had been focused on maintaining high-quality 
products that provide reliable and consistent services and experiences for its customers. So in Boehlje and Roucan-Kane / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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some cases, Deere’s historical approach to innovation might be best described as a “fast 
follower” or “close second” rather than a “first mover.” A key component of Deere’s 
commitment to quality had been the Enterprise Product Development Process (EPDP), which is a 
well-defined stage gate process that products must go through to assure reliable performance 
before a commitment to launch or commercialize is made. This process assures quality in 
products; however, as an integrated process, it can take more time than the marketplace may 
accept. The concern became then, that in the information/electronics domains, the rapid rate of 
technical change meant that the cycle time for successful innovation had to be accelerated and 





Deere had historically focused on and had a strong market position in power, implement and 
combine equipment with traditional commercial producers in Midwest corn/soybean agriculture. 
This historical dominance with this customer base had reinforced the perception that the U.S. 
market was mature, and growth potential was limited. But, by reassessing the market with a 
customer segmentation focus, a different story began to emerge.  
 
Indeed, Deere’s segmentation analysis suggested that there are eight different and important 
customer segments in the farm machinery and equipment market (Figure 2) with different 
attitudes, goals, behaviors, and needs. Deere’s focus on the traditional segment, which had been 

























Figure 2. Deere’s U.S. and Canada Segmentation Scheme 
Source: Provided by Deere and Company 
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past. But, the industry was changing rapidly, and the other segments were becoming increasingly 
more important (Figure 3). Some of these new growing segments—particularly the large/mega 
farm, the ag service provider/custom contractor, and some of the not for profit (state and federal 
government, etc.)—needed machinery and equipment with different features. Larger scale 
growers and specialty crop producers were increasingly concerned about precision and process 
control systems. They were more likely willing to adopt electronic technology as long as it was 
simple to use and reliable. 
 
Changing Markets
While the traditional farm segment is still important, there has been tremendous 
growth in part time/lifestyle and large/mega farm segments.
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Figure 3. Evolution of Deere’s Customer Segments 
Source: provided by Deere and Company 
 
These segments were currently underserved by Deere both in terms of market share and features, 
thus providing significant growth opportunities. Also, proving the information based technology 
in terms of reliability, ease of use, and value for these segments, combined with the continuous 
cost reductions and technological advances of electronic-based technology, would allow Deere to 
market these products to traditional and smaller producers in the future. Results from Deere’s 
market segmentation work suggested that, in fact, the U.S. farm machinery and equipment 
industry may have substantially more growth potential than was perceived, and that new 
information/precision/electronic-based technology (i.e., precision farming) had the potential to 
be the entry point and the lynch-pin to capturing this growth potential. 
 
The New Product/Service Choices 
 
The Ag Division had identified five basic domains of innovations in the area of precision 
farming that might be offered to the market: (1) advanced autotrack/guidance/headland 
management, (2) variable rate seed/fertilizer/chemical application, (3) telematics, (4) 
information/data management along the value chain, and (5) synchronized and autonomous 
equipment. 
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Precision farming dates back to the first yield mapping system presented by the company Ag 
Leader in 1992, shortly after GPS technology became available to the public. Precision farming 
recognizes to the concept of in-field variability. It results in performing the right task, in the right 
place, at the right time. Most precision farming systems consist of a GPS receiver, display unit, 
and desktop software. John Deere’s history in precision farming dates back to 1994, with the 
introduction of a yield-mapping system, and has evolved into five distinct categories: guidance, 
machine control, telematics, information management, and robotics. 
 
Guidance—The ability to pilot farm machinery through a field via GPS satellite signals to reduce 
overlap and improve efficiency (by increasing speed of operation, allowing more work at night 
and/or in low visibility conditions, making the operator less tired). 
 
Machine control—Systems that automate tractors, sprayers, planting, and implement functions, 
such as speed, hydraulic control, on/off control, and rate control to reduce inputs, decrease costs, 
and be more environmentally responsive. 
 
Telematics—A wireless communication system between a vehicle and a remote site, transmitting 
information about the vehicle and its environment. Maintenance information can be recorded; 
location of the equipment can be known at all time; productivity, idle, and transportation times of 
the equipment can be calculated. In short, the systems can be used for efficiency and equipment 
management. 
 
Information management—Collecting data about fields, including field location, seed variety 
planted, seeding depth or planting height, tillage depth, application depth or height, amount of 
products applied, crop yield, harvest moisture level, and weather conditions to make maps and 
informed decisions. The information can be transferred along the value chain to improve 
efficiency and quality control. 
 
Synchronized and autonomous/robotic multi-unit operations—Wireless operation and control of 
multiple machine units (tractors, swathers, harvesters) by one operator. 
 
The Ag Division faced several challenges in these five domains. First, customer adoption 
behavior had propelled the direction of precision farming solutions in several ways. The rapid 
adoption of guidance and machine control products was the result of customers directly reaping 
the benefits of increased productivity, ease of operation, and reduced input costs. Documentation 
and information management solutions struggled due to the inability for customers to see a direct 
benefit. Precision farming products overall had met complexity and price resistance adoption 
challenges.  
 
Second, having products that were compatible with older John Deere equipment, as well as 
competitive equipment, was an eminent priority. John Deere battled enabling compatibility with 
their first systems and the rest of the industry. Full integration of precision farming products into 
John Deere equipment was challenging as a result of different product life cycles varying 
between precision solutions and equipment vehicles.  
 
Third, competition was, of course, an issue. With high potential for growth in the market, many 
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Trimble, Topcorn, Outback, Leica, AutoFarm, Ag Leader, and Raven, for example. Trimble and 
Topcorn offered guidance, application, water management, and information management 
systems (software for planning and documentation). Outback and Leica sold guidance/steering 
systems. Autofarm and Ag Leader provided guidance/steering systems, as well as data collection 
products. In addition, Ag Leader also marketed application control systems. Raven focused on 
the application control domain. Furthermore, the major ag machinery equipment manufacturers 
(such as CNH, AGCO, and CAT) also offered precision farming technology. 
 
Finally, the agricultural team was concerned about dealer support. They had just begun training 
dealers on auto-trac products. This was a necessary, but time-consuming process. Now, they 
were also under pressure to develop training material for the other domains and convince dealers 




Farmers have adopted information technology in fits and starts. Although the use of computers 
and access to the Internet had expanded in recent years as reflected in Figure 4, farmers 
continued to lag behind other industries in the broad use of electronic technology for business 
decisions (in fact only about 30 percent of farmers used computers for business purposes in 
2003), making the adoption of precision products a challenge. Adoption of precision farming 
technology has paralleled that of computer technology, but maybe with even more uncertainty. 
Data from the Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) shows that yield monitors 
and guidance systems were being adopted at a relatively rapid pace, but other technologies, such 
as variable rate application of fertilizer, lime, pesticides, and seed, as well as yield mapping, geo-























Figure 4. U.S. Farms Using Computers, 1997–2003 
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Economic analysis of the benefits to precision farming techniques indicated that guidance 
systems had the fastest payback, and variable application of lime also had financial benefits, but 
other precision farming technologies and techniques were not yet seen as highly profitable. 
Academic studies and budgeting analyses of various precision farming practices underscore the 
uncertainty of the economic and financial payoff to producers adopting some of these practices.  
Analyses of the investments in auto guidance technology indicate a 20 percent increase in field 
speed (Watson and Lowenberg-DeBoer, 2002). Yield monitoring technology does document 
variability in yields in different fields with different soil types, but explicit links to differences in 
fertility and other management practices to enhance yields is less clear (Lowenberg-DeBoer and 
Aghib, 1999; Peone and Lowenberg-DeBoer, 2004). Site specific and variable rate applications 
of lime would appear to have significant economic benefits, but precision applications of seed 
and fertilizer do not have the same potential at prevailing product prices and fertilizer and 
chemical costs (Bullock et al., 1998; Doerge, 2002). 
 
Table 3. Share of U.S. Acreage Using Precision Agriculture Technology
1 




























Yield  map 3.8  10.2  *  5.1 4.6 2.0 
Geo-referenced 
soil map 
3.8  18.7  28.6  9.5 7.3 7.3 
Remote  sensing  4.4  20.5  35.2  4.7 2.8 4.4 
VRT used for:           
Fertilizer/lime 2.8  13.1  11.9  1.6  12.9  4.7 
Seed  *  1.5  2.2  1.2 8.0 3.5 
Pesticides *  3.6  1.3  2.6 10.4  2.7 
Guidance NA NA  NA  NA  14.7  10.4 
*= less than 1 percent. NA = survey not conducted. VRT = variable-rate technology 
1These estimates are revised from previous published estimates based on updated weights from the ARMS. 
2Prior to 2002, respondents were asked if the soil characteristics of the field had ever been geo-referenced. 
Beginning in 2002, respondents were asked about geo-referencing in the current and previous years. 
3The question was reworded in 2002 to better define the term “remotely sensed.* 
Source: Daberkow et al. (2006) 
 
 
A survey of retail agronomy dealerships concerning precision agriculture services indicated 
similar uncertainty in adoption. While more than 80 percent of the 340 respondents used some 
form of precision technologies in their dealerships, the applications were primarily dominated by 
service offerings to customers and manual control/light bar GPS guidance of application 
equipment (Figure 5). Specific service offerings over time have grown erratically since the mid-
1990s and still did not exceed 50 percent of the respondents as of 2006 (Figure 6). Midwest 
dealers were significantly more likely to offer most precision services compared to other regions 
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Figure 5. Use of Precision Technology in 2006 





Figure 6. Precision Ag Services Offered Over Time 
Source: Whipker and Akridge (2006) 
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Figure 7. Precision Ag Services Offered by Region in 2006 
Source: Whipker and Akridge (2006) 
 
 
Data from surveys of Ohio farmers in 1999 and 2003 suggested that adoption of precision 
farming practices was progressing at a slow to moderate pace. As summarized in Table 4, the 
most frequently adopted precision farming practice was geo-referenced grid soil sampling—
adoption increased from eight percent of the respondents in 1999 to 15 percent in 2003. Variable 
rate application of plant nutrients showed similar rates of adoption and growth in adoption since 
1999. Yield monitor adoption nearly doubled from 6 percent to almost 12 percent from 1999 to 
2003; precision guidance was not generally commercially available in 1999 and had been 
adopted by 5 percent of the survey respondents by 2003. Approximately one-third of the 
surveyed farmers had adopted one or more of the precision farming practices in 2003, compared 
to less than 25 percent in 1999. As expected, larger farmers adopted precision farming 
techniques more rapidly and were using a larger number of such techniques compared to smaller 
farmers. 
 
From a global perspective, the data is only available on yield monitor use and indicated that the 
United States and Germany appear to have the highest use, with lower utilization in Denmark, 
Sweden, and Argentina (Table 5). Success in expanding their footprint in precision farming 
technology in the United States would allow Deere to better understand customers’ needs, which 
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Table 4. Percent of Ohio Farmers who had Adopted Various Precision Farming Components in 
March 1999 and 2003 
              Percent Adopting 
    2003  1999 
Georeferenced (i.e., map-based or location specific) grid soil sampling  15.3  8.1 
Variable Rate Application of Phosphorus  14.1  7.3 
Variable Rate (i.e., rate varied across field) Application of Lime  14.0  6.7 
Variable Rate Application of Potassium  13.4  7.3 
Yield Monitor  11.6  6.0 
Boundary Mapping  9.8  4.3 
Variable Rate Application of Nitrogen  7.7  6.3 
Satellite GPS Receiver  7.6  2.2 
Georeferenced Field Scouting for Weeds  6.0  2.3 
Variable Rate Application of Herbicides  5.3  5.7 
Precision Guidance (light-bar navigation or autopilot system  5.2   
Aerial or Satellite Field Photography  5.2  2.7 
Georeferenced Field Scouting for Insects, Pests, or Disease  4.9  2.0 
Variable Rate Seeding  4.2  3.4 
Variable Rate Application of Other Nutrients  4.1  3.9 
GPS or Sensor-Directed Spot Spraying of Herbicides  3.0  1.3 
Variable Rate Application of Pesticides  2.8  2.9 
GPS or Sensor-Directed Spot Spraying of Pesticides  0.9   
Percent who have adopted one or more of above  31.8  23.6 
Source: Batte et al. (2003) 
 
















United States  30,000    2000 Daberkow et al. 136 
Argentina  560   2002 Bragachini 10 
Brazil  100   2002  Molin 1 
Chile  12  2000 Bragachini 8 
Uruguay  4  2000 Bragachini 3 
Europe 
U.K.  400   2000 Stafford 43 
Denmark  400   2000 Stafford 100 
Germany  150  2000 Stafford 7 
Sweden  150  2000 Stafford 48 
France  50  2000 Stafford 2 
Netherlands  6    2000 Stafford 11 
Belgium  6    2000 Stafford 6 
Spain  5  2002 4ECPA <1 
Portugal  4    2002 Conceicao 3 
Other 
Australia  800   2000 Bullock et al. 17 
South Africa  15    2000 Nell 1 
Source: Lowenberg-DeBoer (2003) Boehlje and Roucan-Kane / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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The Key Questions 
 
The challenge was clear. How might the Ag Division deliver on this challenge?  Although there 
were numerous opportunities for new product and service introductions in the traditional areas of 
enhancing the performance and productivity of Deere’s power, tillage, and harvesting equipment, 
the Ag Division felt that the most potential, but also the most uncertainty, might be in the five 
new domains of precision farming. Some of the top-line questions the Ag Division management 
team had decided to focus on were: 
 
1.  What are the types/dimensions of risk/uncertainties associated with innovations in the 
information domain? Give specific examples in each dimension related to Deere and the 
information domain. 
 
2.  What kinds of customers (in terms of age, size, crops produced, etc.) provide the most 
potential for adopting the products/services in these domains? 
 
3.  What are the capacities needed to develop, produce, and commercialize information 
domain products? Does Deere have the capabilities? If not, how should Deere go about 
getting the capabilities? 
 
4.  How can Deere manage the risk/uncertainties associated with investing in the information 
domain? Think about flexibility and the concept of real options, and suggest a 
framework(s) to use this concept.  
 
5.  Should Deere collaborate with specialty electronics companies such as Raven, Ag 
Leader, etc.? Which characteristics should Deere look for in the collaborators/partners 
involved in the development of new technology in these domains, and what 
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Appendix 1. 
 
Exhibit A. Innovation Chronology 
 
1957: Six-row planters and cultivators, John Deere innovations, reach the market. They provide 
50 percent more planting and cultivating capacity for row-crop farmers in corn- and cotton-
producing areas. 
 
1958: The John Deere Credit Company, financier of domestic purchases of John Deere 
equipment, begins operations. 
 
1963: John Deere surpasses IH to become the world's largest producer and seller of farm and 
industrial tractors and equipment. The company ventures into the consumer market, deciding to 
produce and sell lawn and garden tractors, in addition to some attachments, such as mowers and 
snow blowers. 
 
1991: Lawn-and-grounds-care equipment operations in the United States and Canada become a 
separate division. Since 1970 they had been part of the farm-equipment operations. The company 
acquires SABO, a European lawn mower manufacturer.  
 
1992: A program is launched to encourage installation of rollover protective structures and seat 
belts on older tractors. In 1966, John Deere introduced the first commercially available rollover 
protective devices for farm tractors, later releasing the patent to the industry without charge.  
 
2001: Two mapping softwares—JDmap and JDmap Deluxe—are introduced. 
Development of parallel tracking to reduce overlap. 
 
Creation of a new service CropTracer that provides the necessary components of a full service 
traceability program. Launch of Field Doc, an electronic notebook that makes collecting and 
recording information about operations exceptionally easy. 
 
Introduction of the GreenStar™ AutoTrac assisted steering system to reduce the amount of time 
an operator needs to spend steering the tractor. 
 
2002: Development of JD Office, an extended version of JD map. Creation of a new JDLink 
Machine Messenger, a wireless communication and information system for John Deere 
agricultural tractors that makes automated fleet management a reality. 
 
2003: John Deere Introduces GreenStar™ AutoTrac Assisted-Steering for wheeled tractors. 
Introduction of several product enhancements for Parallel Tracking (a manual guidance system) 
and expansion of the GreenStar™ AutoTrac Assisted Steering line-up with the introduction of 
Auto-Trac for 8020 series tractors with MFWD or ILS. 
 
Development of JDLink™ Machine Messenger, a wireless communications system for the new 
John Deere twenty series tractors, which allows owners to monitor tractor performance and 
usage from a secure Internet Web site. Boehlje and Roucan-Kane / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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2004: Further advances in new products include recently introduced self-propelled sprayers; the 
4720 and 4920 models are the Deere's largest and most-productive sprayers ever. Expansion of 
the GreenStar™ AutoTrac Assisted Steering System on more vehicles. 
 
Development of StarFire RTK system with the repeatable guidance that only Real-Time 
Kinematic (RTK) GPS systems can deliver.  
 
2005: Major new-product introduction for model-year 2006 with John Deere 8530 tractor; the 
most powerful row crop tractor ever (275-hp) that allows operators to get more done in less time. 
Equipped with new 9.0-liter engine, this tractor is more fuel-efficient than the previous model. 
Advanced precision-guidance product, which can direct equipment in the field with sub-inch 
accuracy, is introduced. 
 
2006: Deere introduces a high-capacity 4930 self-propelled sprayer; the 120-foot boom makes it 
the most productive sprayer ever built by John Deere. Innovations such as iGuide, for perfectly 
straight rows; iTEC Pro for automated end of row turns, and GS2 Rate Controller to expand the 
capabilities of the GS2 system by acting as a controller for sprayers; reach the market.  
 
John Deere 8430 tractor, powered by the company’s clean-burning engine technology, sets fuel-
efficiency record for its size class. Advanced products appear in the 6030 premium series and 
7030 full-frame tractors.  
 
A new line of productive round balers is launched. 
 
Source: Deere and Company’s Web site, Deere and Company’s annual report, and “The John Deere Way: 







Addendum to the Case Study  
 
The case study was used at an executive management education program focusing on innovation 
in April 2009. The executive program was a four-day session for executives from Syngenta. 
Prior to the case study presentation and discussion, presentations and discussions focused on how 
Syngenta innovates, how to create a culture of innovation, how to implement innovation, and 




To prepare program participants for the case study discussion, a succinct presentation was given. 
The customer segmentation of Christensen and Raynor (2003) was introduced: over-served 
customers, under-served customers, satisfied customers, and non customers. Then, based on 
Christensen (1997), the definitions of disruptive and sustaining innovations were presented. Boehlje and Roucan-Kane / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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Sustaining innovation refers to improving a current product, while disruptive innovation refers to 
the creation of a new product, business model, or service.  
 
The framework developed by McGrath and MacMillan (2000) was also presented. This 
framework (Figure 8) graphs the innovation projects along the dimensions of market and 
technical uncertainty to determine whether risk is being diversified and how the portfolio of 
innovations evolves over time. Market and technical uncertainties are scored using the 
scorecards developed by McGrath and MacMillan (2000).  
 
Major sources of uncertainty are the potential revenue/demand, regulatory aspects, associated 
cost, and upstream supply chain reaction to the innovation project. Market uncertainty refers to 
the lack of knowledge at the market and demand level. Technical uncertainty comes from the 
lack of information about the viability of the innovation. The firm does not know whether or not 
the technology can be developed, and which inputs and skills are needed. The firm also does not 
know how, or if, the user will be able to adopt the product.  
 
Figure 8 maps the variety in the chosen innovation activities. Innovation through positioning 
options creates the right to wait and observe. Innovation through stepping stones options gives 
low-risk access to potentially high upside opportunities. Innovation through scouting options can 
be seen as entrepreneurial experiments. Innovation through enhancement launches represents 
improvement to make today’s product faster, better, or cheaper. Finally, innovation through 
platform launches consists of establishing the company in a leading position, ideally in an 
emerging area with strong growth potential—next generation advantages. The participants were 
given an illustration of the framework with Deere’s example of innovation projects, excluding 
the information domain (Figure 8). 
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Participants’ Discussion 
 
The participants were then asked to break up into groups of four to five people and answer 
questions 2, 3, and 5. The other questions were not investigated because the participants had 
already discussed the implementation of innovation and the customer aspect of innovation at 
length. After the break-out session, participants presented their answers, which are described 
below. 
 
McGrath and MacMillan’s framework was proposed to determine the appropriate portfolio of 
innovation projects to fund and to manage this portfolio over time (see Figure 9). Advanced 
autotrack/guidance/headland management and variable rate seed/fertilizer/chemical application 
can be considered platform launches for Deere. They have medium technical uncertainty, but 
low to medium market uncertainty as the values of those technologies are fairly easy to 
communicate to the customers. Telematics and information management are examples of 
scouting options for Deere. They use developed technologies (we have telematics in our cars, 
planes, and trains), which limits the technical uncertainty. However, the market uncertainty is 
high. Sales representatives may find it more difficult to convince farmers of the benefits that 
these technologies bring than for products such as autotrack. Alternatively, these products may 
service a smaller number of farmers than autotrack systems in the short term. Synchronized and 
autonomous/robotic multi-unit operations are stepping stones for Deere. Requiring the use of 
new technologies, these products have high technical uncertainty. For the same reasons as 
telematics and information management products, synchronized and autonomous/robotic multi-
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One of the participants mentioned that the McGrath and MacMillan’s framework did not take 
into account the market attractiveness. The instructor mentioned how the size of the circles as 
illustrated in Figure 8 could be adapted to represent the market attractiveness; the bigger the 
circle, the more attractive (in terms of generated revenue) the market. 
 
Regarding the question on whether Deere should collaborate/partner with a specialty electronic 
company, most participants recommended collaboration and presented the reasons to justify this 
recommendation as summarized in Table 6. 
 
Table 6. Factors Affecting the Choice of Governance Structure 
Partner Don’t  Partner 
Access technologies  Oblige customers to use the 
whole Deere package 
Access new customers   Nobody was better 
Successful with past partnership experience  Expected payoffs 
Differentiation Culture 
To mitigate risk  Provide the right quality 
Flexibility to experiment with the idea and  
then buy the partner if it’s successful 
Avoid lawsuits on 
intellectual property rights 
Speed to market   
Access to capabilities   
Share costs   
Secure channels   
Competitive advantage   
 
Deere’s core business up until now has been machinery. For the company to enter the 
information domain, Deere will need to develop competencies in electronics, computer, and 
information technology by either buying electronic companies or collaborating with them. These 
electronic competencies will have to be developed throughout the supply chain. The research and 
development teams will have to learn about electronics, in addition to continuing their 
understanding of machinery. The manufacturing processes will have to be adapted to produce 
electronics. Deere will need to find and build relationships with suppliers of electronics. Quality 
controllers will have to learn about electronics. Deere’s marketers and sales representative will 
have to learn about electronic features to market the product properly and to its fullest. Deere’s 
dealers also have service teams at the dealership and on-site; those teams will need to have 
electronic experts on staff. 
 
Participants also stressed the need for Deere to educate dealers on selling precision farming 
products. Both the dealers and the service teams will need to be motivated and rewarded for their 
effort in learning about and selling new products. They will need to understand the reasons 
behind the introduction of those new products or, in other words, be told about Lane’s challenge. 
To make sure dealers devote time to selling information domain products, a dedicated salesforce 
could be put together. Dealers could also be encouraged and rewarded for trying to sell the 
information domain products as an add-on to equipment already in the field. Boehlje and Roucan-Kane / International Food and Agribusiness Management Review Volume 12, Issue 4, 2009 
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As a follow-up to the discussion, Dave Ehlis, director of advanced marketing at Deere and 
Company, provided insights regarding the discussion that had previously taken place. He noted 
that Deere had been prototyping and producing its precision farming products in-house with the 
help of selected universities and the acquisition of companies, such as NavCom technologies, to 
gain capabilities in navigation technologies.  
 
There are several reasons behind these decisions. First, Deere and Company has extensive 
knowledge and a competitive advantage in complex machinery/product design and 
manufacturing suggesting a fairly hierarchical governance structure. Deere is also well known 
for high-quality products. This competitive advantage is best obtained with extensive monitoring 
(i.e., a hierarchical governance structure). Second, Deere has historically focused on and has 
substantial experience in producing in-house, at least partially because of the challenges in 
negotiating the property rights associated with a less hierarchical governance structure. Third, 
these products were expected to generate high profits, and Deere wanted to reach the maximum 
profit. Finally, those products were expected to reach current Deere customers, so the market 
uncertainty was fairly low, and Deere dealers could provide more of a one-stop shopping 
location to the farmer. The acquisition and the collaboration with universities were useful 
strategies to gain capabilities Deere did not have. Finally, at the commercialization level, Deere 
has had experience working with its dealer network, thus relying on the dealers’ human capital to 
attract and retain customers.  
 
Ehlis followed his case discussion with a presentation on Deere’s innovation projects— its past 
innovations and current innovation strategy. He noted the presence of an advisory council made 
of diversified members from an education, culture, and experience standpoint. He also discussed 
and showed a video, which had been shown to all Deere employees, presenting the six 
dimensions/issues in which Deere is looking for innovative solutions: 1) machine productivity, 
2) worksite solutions, 3) environmental sustainability, 4) renewable energy, 5) connecting land 
and lifestyle, and 6) water management. Ehlis ended the presentations with a question and 
answer session. 